Real Effects of Accounting Rules: Evidence from Multinational Firms' Investment Location and Profit Repatriation Decisions by Graham, John R. et al.
 Real Effects of Accounting Rules: Evidence from Multinational Firms’ Investment 
Location and Profit Repatriation Decisions 
 
John R. Graham 
Duke University and NBER 
 
Michelle Hanlon* 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
Terry Shevlin 
University of Washington 
 
Draft:  December 21, 2009 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: 
We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 tax executives to better understand corporate 
decisions about real investment location and profit repatriation. Our evidence indicates that 
avoiding financial accounting income tax expense is as important as avoiding cash taxes when 
corporations decide where to locate operations and whether to repatriate foreign earnings. This 
result is important in light of the recent research about whether financial accounting affects 
investment and in light of the decades of research on foreign investment that examines cash tax 
implications but heretofore has not investigated the importance of financial reporting effects. Our 
analysis suggests that financial reporting is an important factor to be considered in the policy 
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Real Effects of Accounting Rules: Evidence from Multinational Firms’ Investment Location 
and Profit Repatriation Decisions 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the broad research question of whether accounting affects corporate 
investment decisions. Specifically, we study whether the ability to avoid or defer the recording of 
income tax expense on financial statements is an important consideration in real corporate 
investment decisions regarding location of operations and, once foreign operations begin, whether 
to repatriate foreign earnings to the U.S. or reinvest the foreign earnings overseas. The question of 
whether statutory tax rates affect investment location has been studied extensively in prior 
research (see section 3 for a review). Our paper examines whether the U.S. financial accounting 
rules for recording the income tax expense also provide incentives for firms to move investment to 
and retain investment in foreign locations. We emphasize that although we study tax items 
reported on financial statements, our paper contributes to the broad research agenda that 
investigates whether financial reporting in general affects real corporate actions.   
The key issue for our study is that U.S. multinationals can, by declaring their foreign 
source earnings “permanently reinvested” overseas, avoid reporting on their financial statements 
the deferred incremental U.S. income tax expense related to these foreign earnings. This avoidance 
results in lower reported GAAP effective tax rates and higher net incomes.1 Traditional financial 
economics would argue that the “paper” income tax expense recognized on financial statements 
should not affect corporate decision-making. To the contrary, some research indicates that 
financial statement reporting considerations do in fact affect real corporate decisions (see Graham 
                                                 
1 See Hanlon (2003) for a general discussion of the difference between cash taxes and the income tax expense for 
financial accounting purposes.  In short, the income tax expense reported on financial statements is an accrual based 
expense measure and rarely equals the cash taxes paid to the government. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
define the effective tax rate as total worldwide income tax expense divided by worldwide pretax earnings. Throughout 
the rest of the study we refer to this measure as the GAAP ETR.  
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et al., 2005, and the references therein). In addition, anecdotal evidence indicates that accounting 
income tax expense effects are important in repatriation decisions. For example, James Tisch, 
CEO of Loews, wrote a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal stating that, “Unbeknownst 
to many (including legislators and Joint Committee on Taxation estimators), GAAP allows 
corporations to avoid the accrual of taxes on foreign earnings…The results of the interaction of 
our repatriation tax laws and the GAAP accounting rules is that very little in the way of foreign 
earnings are repatriated….The accounting penalty for repatriating even a penny of foreign profits 
is so great that those foreign funds will not come back to the U.S….” (July 5, 2008). 
Little research to date has examined whether financial reporting consequences (i.e., the 
“accounting penalty” to which the CEO above refers) affect corporate location and reinvestment 
versus repatriation decisions. Shackelford et al. (2009) discuss the need for research that examines 
both the tax and accounting implications of real corporate investment decisions. The authors argue 
that because tax and accounting interact in important ways that affect real decisions, researchers 
should incorporate both tax and accounting choices when analyzing and interpreting corporate 
behavior. In addition, Hines (1999) calls for more research that examines the relation between tax 
and non-tax determinants of foreign direct investment. In this paper, we take a step towards filling 
these voids by surveying tax executives to obtain data about the importance of the financial 
accounting expense deferral in these real corporate decisions.   
Specifically, we directly inquire about whether the financial accounting effects of being 
able to designate earnings as permanently reinvested under Accounting Principles Board 
Statement No. 23 (APB 23) affect real corporate decisions about operation location, and profit 
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reinvestment or repatriation.2 In addition, we examine the relative importance of the deferral of 
actual cash income taxes versus the deferral of the income tax expense recognition for financial 
accounting purposes. The use of survey evidence is appropriate for our research questions because 
the cash and accounting effects are difficult, if not impossible, to separately identify using archival 
data. One reason for this difficulty is that there is no tradeoff in this setting between tax and 
financial reporting.3  Thus, reliably identifying whether firms are responding to the accounting 
incentives or the tax incentives is hard to accomplish using archival data. In our survey, we 
directly ask tax directors about the cash tax effects and the financial accounting effects as separate 
factors in their decision-making process. Thus, using a survey of executives allows us to avoid the 
use of proxies in our main analysis where we investigate whether the financial accounting effects 
are important in the firms’ decisions about investment location and profit repatriation.   
Our evidence indicates that the ability to avoid or defer the recording of income tax 
expense on financial statements is an important consideration in real corporate investment 
decisions regarding location of operations and whether to repatriate foreign earnings to the U.S. or 
reinvest the foreign earnings overseas. For example, nearly one-third of the respondents rated 
income tax expense deferral under APB 23 as being important in their decision to locate 
operations outside of the U.S. Moreover, when we restrict the sample to firms we expect to be 
most concerned with financial reporting effects relative to all other factors (publicly traded, with 
foreign assets, and high intangibles), nearly 60 percent of these firms say financial accounting 
expense deferral is important in their real decision to invest in a foreign location. In addition, 44 
                                                 
2 APB 23 provides an exception to deferred tax accounting where a deferred tax expense is not recorded on financial 
statements for foreign subsidiary earnings that are declared to be permanently reinvested overseas.  We discuss this 
provision more below. 
3 We provide a detailed discussion of the tax and accounting rules in the next section.  For a review and discussion of 
the book-tax tradeoff literature see Shackelford and Shevlin (2001).  In many settings firms wanting to reduce cash 
taxes also have to report lower book income thus facing a book-tax tradeoff.  In the setting here, reducing cash taxes 
by deferring repatriation also can increase (as opposed to reduce) book income if the firm designates at least some of 
the foreign earnings as permanently reinvested overseas. 
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percent of respondents state that deferral of the financial accounting tax expense is important in 
their decision of whether to repatriate foreign earnings to the U.S. or reinvest foreign earnings 
outside of the U.S. Again, after restricting the sample (to firms that are publicly traded, with 
foreign assets, and high intangibles), the data reveal that nearly two-thirds of respondents indicate 
that financial accounting expense deferral is important in their decision about whether to repatriate 
earnings or reinvest earnings outside of the U.S. For both decisions – where to locate operations 
and whether to reinvest or repatriate foreign earnings – the importance of the financial accounting 
expense deferral is as important statistically as the importance of cash tax deferral when making 
these decisions. These results are surprising in light of the decades of research on the location and 
repatriation decisions that tests the cash tax implications but has heretofore not examined the 
financial accounting effects.  
The implications of our evidence are that the financial accounting effects lead to greater 
foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals, all else constant. Moreover, in addition to the 
evidence in Foley et al. (2007) about repatriation taxes contributing to large corporate cash 
holdings, our results suggest that financial reporting expense deferral is very likely to be another 
contributing factor. Overall, our results suggest that financial accounting expense deferral impacts 
real decisions that could have macroeconomic effects.4  
An underlying question is why firms care so much about the effective tax rate (GAAP 
ETR) and reported accounting earnings. We offer some conjectures and supporting evidence. 
First, a lower GAAP ETR increases after-tax accounting income, which previous research has 
shown affects stock price and thus shareholder returns. Second, compensation contracts could be 
affected by the GAAP ETR. For example, to the extent that stock option or other forms of equity 
                                                 
4 These macroeconomic effects include increased investment in foreign locations, large cash balances, increased 
domestic debt levels, job creation overseas, and less tax revenue to the U.S. government. 
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based compensation are used, then the aforementioned relation between after tax earnings and 
stock prices will affect compensation. Furthermore, if bonus and other performance plans are 
based on after-tax earnings (e.g., in value added measurement plans in which the effective tax rate 
is used to adjust for taxes (see Young and O’Byrne, 2001)), then the reported GAAP ETR will be 
important. Third, in general, it is well documented that a lower GAAP ETR is important and that 
tax departments are profit centers for many firms (see Robinson et al., 2009).  
Another potential reason for viewing the GAAP ETR as important is because both it and 
after-tax earnings are compared across firms, including firms in other tax jurisdictions. In 
interviews with several of our respondents, we find that their companies view the non-recognition 
of deferred tax expense on permanently reinvested earnings as an item that better aligns U.S. 
multinationals’ effective tax rates with the rates of foreign competitors and as an item that 
increases comparability of firms’ financial statements. For example, in the interviews we heard 
comments such as: “The designation of permanently reinvested earnings allows us to get our 
effective tax rate within striking distance of our international competitors’ rates” and “… puts us 
on a more even playing field with [our competitor]” and “Our main competitor is in [another 
country] and their financial statements do not have this effect because there is no residual tax.”5 
Indeed, in a letter to the International Accounting Standards Board, the Financial Executives 
Institute argued that effectively eliminating APB 23 would not “improve comparability of 
financial reports of U.S. preparers and non-U.S. preparers subject to IAS” and that in fact 
“comparability of financial reports will suffer…because many countries have a territorial tax 
system” and have no residual home country tax to record. The letter goes on to state that if taxes 
on permanently reinvested earnings were recorded for a U.S.-based company, “…earnings could 
                                                 
5 Phrases in brackets replace phrases that may identify the respondent firms. By residual tax the individual is referring 
to the incremental (residual) U.S. tax on foreign earnings over and above the tax in the foreign jurisdiction. 
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be significantly affected relative to the foreign-based company when the companies are actually in 
essentially the same economic position…comparability would diverge rather than converge.”6  
Thus, the GAAP ETR is potentially an important metric to firms because it affects stock prices, 
compensation contracts, and/or is an important benchmark.  
We use survey data based on tax executive responses to conduct our analyses. Thus, we 
would be remiss not to mention that our data and results are subject to the general caveats 
associated with all survey data. When drafting the survey we attempted to word the questions 
carefully and worked with a survey consulting firm (discussed below) to employ best practices. In 
addition, we compare our firms’ data to the data from the Compustat population and to the survey 
non-responders in an effort to test for non-response bias. However, despite these efforts if there is 
some unforeseen systematic tendency to obscure the truth or to be unconsciously biased on 
particular questions, our results could be affected.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the tax and accounting 
rules related to the foreign earnings of a U.S. multinational. Section 3 discusses the prior literature 
regarding accounting effects on investment, investment location decisions, and the reinvestment or 
repatriation decision. Section 4 discusses our survey approach, how we obtained our sample, and 
descriptive data on the respondents. Section 5 analyzes the survey responses. Section 6 examines 
whether the importance of financial accounting expense deferral provides some explanation for 
why firms hold so much cash. Section 7 concludes. 
  
 
                                                 
6 Excerpted from the Financial Executives Institute letter to Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the IASB dated June 14, 
2004. Currently IAS12 effectively retains the APB 23 tax treatment (as does SFAS 109) of including an exception to 
deferred tax accounting for basis differences between book and tax for investments in foreign subsidiaries that are 
essentially permanent in nature (i.e., if the company designates the foreign earnings as permanently reinvested the 
company does not record the incremental repatriation tax in its home country).  
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2. Taxation and Accounting Rules for Foreign Earnings  
2.1.      Taxation of foreign earnings 
The United States taxes corporate and individual income on a worldwide basis. This means 
that U.S. taxes are owed on income earned in the U.S. as well as on income earned abroad. 
However, an important feature of the U.S. tax system is what is known as deferral.  In general, a 
U.S. parent is taxed on its subsidiaries’ foreign income only when those foreign earnings are 
repatriated back to the parent corporation.7 Until repatriation, foreign earnings reinvested in 
foreign operations are allowed to grow U.S.-tax free.    
To avoid subjecting U.S. multinationals (and individuals) to double taxation, the U.S. 
allows a foreign tax credit (in recognition of income taxes paid to foreign governments) that 
reduces the U.S. tax owed on repatriated foreign earnings. In simple terms and ignoring 
limitations, if the U.S. tax rate (e.g., 35%) exceeds a given firm’s average foreign tax rate (e.g., 
30%), the company has to pay U.S. tax on repatriated foreign earnings at a rate equal to the 
difference between the U.S tax rate and the foreign tax rate (e.g., 5%). In contrast, if the firm’s 
average foreign tax rate exceeds the U.S. tax rate, the company will not owe any incremental U.S. 
tax upon repatriation (nor will it receive an immediate rebate from the U.S. government, though it 
will accumulate a foreign tax credit).8  
 
 
                                                 
7 Deferral is only available for U.S. taxes on earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents; it is not available for the 
earnings of a foreign branch. The earnings of the foreign subsidiaries are not subject to U.S. tax when earned because 
foreign subsidiaries are not consolidated for U.S. tax purposes. If the foreign subsidiary had income effectively 
connected with a U.S. trade or business then that income would be immediately subject to U.S. tax; however, the 
foreign subsidiary still would not be part of the tax consolidation with the U.S. parent. There are provisions, such as 
the Subpart F rules, which aim to discourage U.S. firms from taking full advantage of deferral.  Under these rules, 
certain foreign income of foreign subsidiaries is not eligible for deferral and is subject to immediate taxation in the 
U.S.  Subpart F income includes, among other items, passive income of the foreign subsidiary.  
8 Foreign tax credits can be carried over (back one year, forward 10 years).  There are limitations on the amount of 
foreign tax credit that can be utilized, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. See Scholes et al. 
(2009) for details.  
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2.2.       Accounting for foreign earnings and the U.S. taxation of those earnings 
A firm’s financial statements include the income or loss of foreign subsidiaries that are 
more than 50 percent owned, and the representative share of income or loss of foreign entities 
owned between 20 and 50 percent (under the equity method of accounting). A firm’s tax return, 
however, does not include any of these earnings amounts. Instead, a firm’s U.S. tax return only 
includes dividends (i.e., cash) received from these entities (while financial statement income 
excludes these dividend amounts because the accounting earnings were already included when 
earned under financial accounting principles).  
As a result, for a U.S. multinational, the difference between current year foreign 
accounting earnings and current year cash dividends repatriated from the foreign jurisdiction is a 
temporary difference on which incremental U.S. deferred taxes would normally be accrued. Such 
an accrual would increase the GAAP effective tax rate and lower net income reported on financial 
statements. However, an exception is provided in Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23 
(APB 23), which states that the accrual for taxes that would be due on future repatriations should 
not be recognized if the indefinite reversal exception applies. In other words, if a firm has foreign 
earnings in a foreign subsidiary that the company deems to be permanently reinvested (i.e., the 
company does not plan to repatriate the earnings), the firm’s financial statement tax provision will 
not include an accrual of U.S. taxes that would be due on repatriation of those earnings, even 
though the earnings are included in book income. Thus, all else equal, if a company has earnings 
in a low tax country that it reinvests and designates as permanently reinvested, the company will 
have a lower GAAP effective tax rate and higher after-tax earnings relative to what earnings 
would be if the earnings were earned in the U.S. or earned in the foreign subsidiary but not 
designated as permanently reinvested. Hereafter, we refer to this accounting effect as APB 23 tax 
expense deferral. 
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An example of a firm’s disclosure is included in Appendix B. This disclosure illustrates the 
effect of designating foreign earnings as permanently reinvested on the firm’s GAAP ETR. Note 
for this company the effect of having $21 billion in earnings overseas and designated as 
permanently reinvested reduces their GAAP ETR by 6.6 percentage points (because there is no 
incremental U.S. tax expense accrued), which in turn increases the firm’s income reported on its 
financial statements.    
3. Prior Research  
 
We briefly review two broad areas of related literature. The first includes research about 
financial accounting effects on investment decisions. In this subarea we include two types of 
research.  First, the book-tax tradeoff literature which generally documents that pre-tax financial 
accounting concerns dominate tax concerns, consistent with financial accounting effects being 
important in firm investment decisions. Second, the recent literature centered on earnings quality 
or accounting method choices and investment. Our study is related to both of these types of studies 
but centers on the effect of financial accounting -- via the income tax expense -- on investment 
location decisions. Because we examine investment location, our study also relates to a second 
broad area of the literature that has examined the determinants of locating investment overseas. 
This area of the literature has potentially large macroeconomic and public policy implications but 
has heretofore not examined the importance of financial accounting with regard to investment 
location. Our study contributes to both of these broad areas of the literature.      
  
3.1.  Research about financial accounting effects on corporate decisions 
There is a relatively long literature examining the tradeoffs firms make between tax 
reporting and financial accounting reporting that documents the importance of financial 
accounting effects. In sum, the evidence is generally consistent with firms leaving tax dollars “on 
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the table” in order to improve their financial reporting results. A portion of this literature is about 
corporate decisions about investment. For example, prior research examines whether the rules for 
LIFO accounting providing incentives for inventory purchases or liquidations near the end of 
accounting periods (Dhaliwal et al., 1994; and Hunt et al., 1995). Other studies examine the tax 
and accounting tradeoffs for asset divestitures (Bartov, 1993; Klassen, 1997; and Maydew et al., 
1999), the payment of taxes on overstated accounting earnings (Erickson et al., 2004), and capital 
structure decisions (Engel et al., 1999). While some of these decisions are what some might label 
as “real” (e.g., asset divestitures), many of the decisions examined in the literature are more about 
timing or reporting (e.g., the timing of the divestiture decision (Bartov, 1993), the divestiture 
method (tax- free or taxable, e.g., Maydew et al., 1999), or the amount of gain recorded upon the 
divestiture (e.g., Klassen, 1997)). Other previously studied investment decisions may be 
considered “real” (e.g., inventory purchases), but in contrast to locating operations overseas, are 
the type that are easily reversed (e.g., R&D spending and inventory purchases can be increased in 
one period and decreased in a later period).9   
 A broad range of other studies also exemplify the interest and importance of financial 
accounting effects on corporate investment decisions, but from a somewhat different aspect. For 
example, Biddle et al. (2009) examine the effect of financial reporting quality on investment 
efficiency. The authors posit that higher financial reporting quality reduces the information 
asymmetry between firms and suppliers of capital, making it easier to attract capital, facilitating 
                                                 
9 Prior research documents that tax incentives increase spending on research and development (e.g., Berger, 1993) but 
that financial accounting disincentives reduce research and development spending. For example, Bushee (1998) 
reports that firms reduce research and development spending when close to an earnings target (Bushee, 1998) and 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) report that when executives have short horizons research and development spending 
decreases. More recent work examines a condition under which these two incentives – book and tax – are traded off in 
the research and development spending decision, but only in the very specific case of the accounting for stock option 
compensation for R&D personnel (Brown and Krull, 2008). 
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better contracts that enhance efficient investing, and enabling stronger monitoring.10 In other 
studies, McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Jackson et al. (2009) examine whether accounting 
earnings reported for external users influence managers’ investment decisions. Specifically, 
McNichols and Stubben (2008) report firms that overstate their earnings also over-invest as if the 
managers themselves are “fooled” by the falsely reported earnings. More closely related to our 
current paper, Jackson et al. (2009) provide evidence that a firm’s chosen depreciation method 
affects its capital investment. The authors hypothesize that managers’ investment decisions are 
affected by depreciation method choices and one of the reasons they cite is financial reporting 
earnings consequences.   
Our study also investigates the effect of accounting on investment. In our case, however, it 
is not an accounting method choice that is of interest, but rather the accounting rule that provides 
an exception to deferred tax accounting for foreign subsidiary earnings. In addition, the decision 
we examine is a real investment location decision that is not easily reversed and that has 
potentially important macroeconomic effects – the location of operations for U.S. multinationals. 
3.2. Location decisions 
In deciding where to locate operations, firms must consider many factors, such as local 
infrastructure, labor supply, culture, economy, political risk, distance to customers, financing 
opportunities, and the location’s tax rates and policies. Single (1999) asked 66 experienced tax 
executives of major U.S.-based multinationals in the manufacturing industry to review a 
subsidiary plant location scenario and evaluate the relative importance of all the location-specific 
factors. Only five of the factors were tax-related: The corporate tax rate, tax holidays, the presence 
of a treaty with the U.S., withholding rates, and accelerated capital write-off provisions. Single 
(1999) reports that the five tax factors ranked among the lower half of importance of all factors in 
                                                 
10 See also Biddle and Hilary (2006), Bushman and Smith (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Lambert et al. (2007). 
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the location decision and concludes that non-tax factors often drive the decision. More detailed 
analysis of the extent to which taxes in the foreign country impact location decisions is conducted 
by Wilson (1993) who investigates the role of taxes in location decisions through interviews with 
nine companies. Wilson (1993) concludes that tax considerations largely dictate location decisions 
in business activities for which nontax costs are low, such as administrative centers. However, for 
manufacturing location decisions he reports that nontax considerations are very important, even 
when the final decision is to locate in a low tax country. Finally, Kemsley (1998) tests whether the 
ratio of exports to foreign production varies with export incentives and foreign country tax rates. 
Kemsley (1998) finds that greater export incentives are associated with higher exports and lower 
host country taxes are associated with a lower ratio of exports to foreign production.  None of 
these studies examine the financial accounting implications of locating operations in a foreign 
jurisdiction, the subject of our paper.      
Numerous studies in economics attempt to estimate the effect of host country taxation on 
foreign direct investment in a country. For example, Grubert and Mutti (2000) use tax returns of 
500 U.S. multinationals and estimate that a lower tax rate, which increases the after-tax return to 
capital by one percent, is associated with roughly a three percent higher rate of capital investment. 
Indeed DeMooij and Ederveen (2003) compare the results of 25 empirical studies and conclude 
that the median response documented in the literature to a one percent reduction in the host 
country tax rate is slightly more than a three percent increase in foreign direct investment in that 
country.11 Thus, there is substantial evidence suggesting that host country taxation affects location 
decisions. However, to our knowledge, no empirical study has examined the importance of 
financial accounting income tax expense deferral in location decisions. 
                                                 
11 See Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001), Devereux and Freeman (1995), Hines (1996, 1997, and 1999), and 
Slemrod (1990). In earlier work, Hines (1999) surveys the literature to date and finds an overall elasticity of -0.6. 
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Shackelford et al. (2009) hypothesize that the discretion in financial reporting that a firm 
gains via foreign operations gives companies an incentive to locate in low-tax countries, e.g., tax 
havens. This incentive occurs because generally the lower the foreign tax rate, the greater the U.S. 
tax due upon repatriation and thus the larger the financial accounting expense that can remain 
unrecognized by locating abroad, reinvesting foreign profits, and designating those profits as 
permanently reinvested. The model the authors develop implies that because the non-recognition 
of the expense is valued by managers, GAAP rules could have the effect of encouraging 
investment in low-tax countries or tax havens. We test this hypothesis in our paper. 
3.3. Reinvestment or repatriation decisions  
Previous research has investigated the corporate decision of whether to reinvest or 
repatriate foreign earnings. General considerations include relative domestic and foreign rates of 
return and local politics. For brevity, we review only the literature on the tax effects on 
reinvestment and repatriation.  
There is some debate about the extent to which a home country repatriation tax is 
important. For example, Hartman (1985) demonstrates that, if the repatriation and U.S. taxation of 
foreign earnings is inevitable and tax rates are constant (and these are crucial assumptions), then 
U.S. repatriation taxes do not affect the choice by mature firms to reinvest funds abroad or 
repatriate the earnings.12 Others argue that firms can (easily) tax plan around the repatriation tax 
(Altshuler and Grubert, 2003) and thus the tax is not an important factor. In addition, there is the 
empirical observation that little U.S. tax is actually collected on foreign earnings (Grubert and 
Mutti, 1995; Altshuler and Newlon, 1993; U.S. Treasury, 2007; U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2008; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009). However, many empirical tests in a variety of settings 
                                                 
12 See Hartman (1985) and Scholes et al. (2009) for the model (and a discussion) of a firm’s decision to reinvest or 
repatriate earnings. 
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document that the repatriation tax affects profit repatriations (Desai et al., 2001; Altshuler and 
Newlon, 1993; Blouin and Krull, 2009; Brennan, 2008). Further, Foley et al. (2007) provide 
evidence consistent with the repatriation tax being a determinant of U.S. firms’ large foreign cash 
balances. All of these studies examine the importance of the home country repatriation tax; none 
examine the importance of the financial accounting effects.   
A contemporaneous paper by Blouin et al. (2009) examines capital market incentives on 
corporate repatriations using survey data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Their 
paper is similar to ours in that both papers investigate the same general question of whether 
financial accounting effects (APB 23 tax expense deferral) impact firms’ decisions to repatriate 
earnings. Their paper uses BEA data and our paper uses our self-compiled survey data from 
corporate tax executives specifically designed to address our particular research question. Blouin 
et al. test only repatriations and how they vary with proxies for capital market pressures. We use 
our directed questions to examine whether accounting effects are important in a broader set of 
questions: investment and repatriation decisions (repatriation in general and under a recent 
temporary tax act). Blouin et al. (2009) interpret their results as being consistent with APB 23 tax 
expense deferral influencing the repatriation decision, consistent with and supporting our results. 
However, the use of the BEA archival data, and their tests in particular, require some maintained 
assumptions making it difficult to reliably separate the accounting effects from the tax effects.13 
While survey data bring their own set of concerns (see caveats below), one benefit of our survey 
approach is that we directly ask tax executives to separately identify the importance of the cash tax 
deferral and the accounting expense deferral. Overall, we view our paper and the Blouin et al. 
                                                 
13 Specifically, the first set of tests in Blouin et al. (2009) relies on the public/private designation as the proxy for 
capital market pressures, thus requiring an assumption that public and private firms value cash tax savings 
equivalently in order to be able to identify the effects of capital market pressures. The data in our survey responses (as 
discussed below) are inconsistent with this assumption. The second set of tests in Blouin et al. (2009) regresses 
repatriations on the level of permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) which is somewhat circular in nature since the 
PRE designation means that the firm is not repatriating the earnings by definition.     
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paper as complementary, with both adding to the portfolio of knowledge about repatriation 
decisions.14    
4. Survey Approach and Sample 
We developed our survey instrument with the support of Tax Executives Institute 
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. We solicited feedback from members of both groups as well 
as from academic researchers. Survey Sciences Group (SSG), a survey research consulting 
firm, assisted with the survey formatting and programmed an online version. SSG also 
professionally formatted a paper version of the survey that we distributed with our final 
reminder invitation (discussed below). We had two companies beta test the survey and we 
made revisions based on their suggestions. The final survey contained 64 questions, most 
with subparts. The paper version of the survey was 12 pages long. There were many 
branching questions and as a result many firms were directed to answer only a portion of 
the questions. See www.ssgresearch.com/taxsurvey for the online version of the survey. 
The paper version is available from the authors upon request. 
An initial email invitation was sent on August 9, 2007 to the 2,794 member firms 
of Tax Executives Institute. We examined the list of Fortune 500 companies and identified 
45 firms that were not members of Tax Executives Institute. For these firms, Price 
WaterhouseCoopers supplied the tax executive’s name and email address. Three email 
invitations were returned as undeliverable. On August 15, 2007 we sent a letter via two-
day express mail to fifteen companies for which we did not have email addresses. A total 
of 2,806 companies received invitations to complete the survey. 
                                                 
14 Another related study is Krull (2004), who examines whether firms designate earnings as permanently reinvested in 
an attempt to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. She reports evidence consistent with firms doing so.   
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SSG sent three email reminders throughout August and September. We then sent a 
paper version of the survey (along with a letter with instructions of how to complete the 
questionnaire online) during the last week of September and the first week of October. We 
closed the online survey on November 9, 2007. 
A total of 804 firms accessed the survey. Sixty of these companies entered no more 
than two responses and thus we delete them from our sample leaving 744 usable responses. 
The response rate for our survey is 26.5 percent, higher than many prior survey studies. 
For example, Graham et al. (2005) obtain a response rate of 10.4 percent, Trahan and 
Gitman (1995) report a response rate of 12 percent, Graham and Harvey (2001) obtain a 9 
percent response rate, and Brav et al. (2005) report a 16 percent response rate. In addition, 
Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) survey tax preparers (12 percent response rate) and 
corporate taxpayers (9 percent response rate) about compliance costs, and Slemrod and 
Blumenthal (1996) obtain a 21.8 percent response rate in a survey of large corporate 
taxpayers about compliance costs. Thus, our response rate compares favorably with other 
recent surveys.15  
We are most interested in U.S. multinationals’ decisions with respect to the 
financial accounting treatment of the corporate income tax. Therefore, we eliminate eleven 
firms that indicate they are an S-corporation or other type of flow-through entity and are 
thus not subject to the U.S. corporate income tax. We also eliminate 29 companies that 
state they did not file a form 1120 (under the assumption that these companies are also not 
                                                 
15 We believe the support of Tax Executives Institute was very helpful in increasing the response rate.  In addition, 
there seemed to be genuine interest in the topics we asked about as evidenced by the respondents’ comments.  For 
example, one company wrote “Appreciate the survey. Interestingly, the survey touches on those tax management areas 
most important to our company at the moment…”  Another commented “I rarely fill out surveys, but was impressed 
by your questions.”  Another respondent just wrote, “Good survey!” 
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C-corporations).16 We restrict the sample further by eliminating observations for 
subsidiaries of foreign parents (105 firms) and for responses that state in their comments 
that their foreign operations were insignificant and thus they were not sure how to respond 
to the foreign earnings questions (4 firms). This leaves 595 remaining firms on which we 
conduct our analyses. The sample size varies across questions due to branching or 
incomplete responses for that particular question. 
5. Descriptive Statistics, Research Questions, Results, and Inferences 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The survey was divided into four parts. The first section asked general descriptive 
questions about the companies. The second part of the survey asked questions about general 
location and reinvestment and repatriation decisions, the subject of the current paper. The third 
part focused on the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act and repatriation decisions in response to that 
Act (e.g., sources and uses of cash repatriated). The final part of the survey asked general 
questions about tax aggressiveness, tax rates, and tax planning. The data from the third and fourth 
parts of the survey are analyzed in separate papers. 
The descriptive data for our sample firms are summarized in Table 1, Panel A. In terms of 
ownership, 75 percent of the respondents are publicly traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX, 
23 percent are privately held, and the remaining 2 percent responded that they were ‘other’ such as 
over the counter stocks. Our respondent firms represent a variety of industries, with roughly 30 
percent being from manufacturing, 16 percent classified as holding companies, almost seven 
percent from professional, scientific, and technical services, and six percent from retail trade 
                                                 
16 There were 24 companies that actually answered that they filed zero 1120s. There were 5 companies that did not 
answer the question and were deleted from the sample because by analyzing the other questions in the survey we 
determined that these companies were likely not C corporations either.  
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(industry classifications are derived from the companies’ responses about their principal business 
activity code on Form 1120).  In all, 19 different industry classifications are represented.  
 It is difficult using publicly available archival sources to obtain data on the location of a 
firm’s assets. Using a survey, we are able to gather this information. In our sample, 53 percent of 
the respondents indicate that their companies have 10 percent or less of their assets in foreign 
locations. Slightly more than 8 percent of the firms have more than half of their assets in foreign 
locations.  
Examining tax return filing characteristics reveals that our sample firms range from simple 
to complex in nature. For example, 94 percent of the respondents file a consolidated tax return. Of 
these consolidated returns, 58 percent include more than 10 entities in the tax filing. In addition, 
80 percent of the sample file at least one Form 5471, indicating these companies have significant 
ownership interests in foreign subsidiaries.  
We report firms’ GAAP ETRs (total worldwide income tax expense/worldwide pretax 
book income) in Table 1 as well. We ask privately held companies to report their GAAP effective 
tax rate and we compute the ratio using financial statement data for the publicly traded firms in 
our sample (the data are for the most recent year prior to completing the survey). Consistent with 
archival GAAP ETR data (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008), most of the firms report a GAAP effective 
tax rate in the 30 percent to 40 percent range, with the distribution being asymmetric -- more firms 
report a relatively lower rate than a relatively higher rate. The data in Table 1 also reveal that 46 
percent of the respondents indicate their firm has a U.S. net operating loss (NOL) carryforward, 50 
percent report that their firm has foreign NOLs, and 69 percent have state tax NOLs. Finally, 
three-fourths of the sample firms have foreign sourced earnings. Thus, collectively the descriptive 
data indicate that the majority of firms in our sample have complex tax structures and international 
activities.  
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One of the limitations of using survey data is the potential for non-response bias (e.g., 
perhaps only a certain type of firm answered our survey and/or some types of firms avoided our 
survey, which would make the results less generalizable). To address non-response bias, we use 
data from Compustat to compare the surveyed firms to all Compustat firms, and within the 
surveyed firms, we compare the responding firms to the non-responding firms.17 We report these 
comparisons in Table 2. In columns (1) and (2), we find that our average sample firm is larger than 
the average Compustat firm in terms of assets (even though our sample includes private firms for 
the asset measure), market value, and sales. Our average sample firm has a larger debt-to-asset 
ratio, a smaller cash-to-asset ratio, and a smaller market-to-book ratio relative to the average 
Compustat firm.  Further, our sample firms have on average a higher return-on-assets, a higher 
effective tax rate, and lower asset and sales growth rates. Thus, our sample firms are not small or 
poorly performing, and therefore our results might not generalize to such firms.   
The comparison of respondent to non-respondent firms is shown in Table 2, columns (3) 
and (4). The average respondent firm is marginally smaller in terms of assets but similar in terms 
of market value and sales to the average non-respondent firm. In addition, the respondent firms 
have, on average, lower debt ratios, higher cash ratios, and a higher return-on-assets. While there 
are some differences we cannot think of any obvious biases that arise because of the differences. 
Finally, in terms of industry composition, it appears that the respondent and non-respondent 
samples are similar. It does appear that our survey population is overrepresented in manufacturing 
industries and underrepresented in terms of financial services, insurance, and real estate.    
 
 
                                                 
17 We recognize that Compustat is limited to publicly traded firms and hence inferences based on this analysis are 
limited. 
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5.2.         Research questions and survey responses 
5.2.1.    Location decision – unconditional analysis 
 We ask the following question to investigate the corporate decision of whether to locate 
operations in the U.S. or outside the U.S.: “Relative to all the factors your company considers 
when making a decision about whether to locate operations in the U.S. or outside the U.S., how 
important are the following?” The factors are 1) foreign tax rate, 2) U.S. cash tax deferral, and 3) 
financial accounting expense deferral under APB 23. The phrase “relative to all other factors” is 
intended to control for other factors such as the stability of the local government, regulation, work 
ethic of labor force, utilities, proximity to target market, import/export restrictions, transportation 
costs, etc.18    
The respondents are asked to rate each of the factors on a 5 point scale ranging from “Not 
at all important” (given a numerical representation of 0) to “Very important” (a numerical 
representation of 4). In our analysis of the data we interpret these ratings in several ways. First, we 
classify ratings of three or four on the zero to four scale as being “important” to the firm and 
ratings of zero and one as being “not important.” Second, we compute the average rating for each 
factor. Finally, we interpret the ratings as a ranking of the relative importance of the factors.  
The easiest way to view the results is via the graphs in Figure 1. Panel A presents data for 
all respondent firms. The graph reveals that approximately 38 percent of firms indicate that the 
foreign tax rate is important in their decision to invest in a foreign location. Slightly more than 35 
percent of the respondents say that the availability of U.S. cash deferral is important. In terms of 
the importance of financial accounting expense deferral under APB 23, a little more than 31 
                                                 
18 We acknowledge that by focusing on a subset of relevant factors it is possible that salience gives rise to 
respondents ranking these factors as more important than they would if confronted by a more comprehensive 
list.  However, to mitigate this problem, we compare the rankings across the named factors and conduct 




percent of firms say that this is an important factor in their decision making process when 
determining whether to make an investment overseas. While less than half the overall sample say 
the factor is important, for a factor not previously investigated in prior research and one that 
represents a “paper” deferral of one expense item, it is surprising to us that nearly one-third of 
companies indicate that financial statement expense deferral is important relative to all other 
factors when deciding whether to make a foreign investment.   
Table 3 presents the data in table format. In Panel A, for each factor, we present the 
percent of respondents that answered that the factor was important (received a rating of 3 or 4) and 
the percent of firms that answered that the factor was not important (a rating of 0 or 1). The mean 
rating for foreign tax rate is 1.86, for U.S. cash tax deferral is 1.76 and for financial accounting 
expense deferral under APB 23 is 1.65. Although none of these ratings is greater than 2 (medium 
importance), we note that this question is about a decision to locate operations overseas. We 
would not expect tax and accounting factors to, on average, be very important for a diverse sample 
of firms because there are many other factors to consider when deciding where to locate 
operations (e.g., labor force, political stability of the country, etc.). Further, when the importance 
rating of the cash tax deferral factor is compared to the importance rating of the financial 
accounting expense deferral factor, they are not statistically distinguishable from each other (t-
statistic of 1.32 on the difference in means). This implies a “paper” accounting expense is equally 
important as a factor that directly affects cash flows (cash tax deferral).   
5.2.2.   Location decision – conditional analysis 
 We next investigate ratings based on a variety of firm characteristics. For example, we 
explicitly test whether public firms are different from private firms in their rating of financial 
accounting effects because prior literature demonstrates that public firms are under greater 
financial reporting pressure than private firms and, as a result, are willing to incur costs to achieve 
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a desired financial accounting outcome (Cloyd et al., 1996; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mikhail, 
1999). Thus, we predict that publicly owned companies will rate financial accounting expense 
deferral as more important than private firms.  
We also condition on the level of the effective tax rate the firm reports. We predict that 
firms with a lower reported effective tax will rank financial accounting concerns higher than firms 
with a high reported effective tax rate. We interpret the effective tax rate as a revelation of 
corporate preferences for low or high rates (similar to Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). Thus, firms 
with a low rate engage in actions to achieve that low rate and, as a result, should rank financial 
accounting expense deferral more highly than firms with a high effective tax rate. Finally, we 
condition on the amount of research and development expense (R&D) as a proxy for the type of 
firm that can more easily locate in a foreign jurisdiction and ship product and more easily shift 
income through intangibles (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998) as compared to locating heavy 
manufacturing operations abroad (Wilson, 1993). We predict that firms with large R&D 
expenditures will rate financial accounting concerns as being more important in location (and 
repatriation) decisions because locating near customers is not as important in relative terms (i.e., 
shipping the product is easier for these firms). We use R&D spending as the underlying construct 
for the “firm type” that we condition on. One might group by industry, however, we note that 
pharmaceutical firms are classified as manufacturers in our sample (by tax form industry codes) 
and thus industry analysis would combine pharmaceutical firms in the same group with less 
intangible intensive manufacturers, whereas we predict differences across these two sets of firms. 
We do, however, include industry fixed effects in our regressions below in order to control for any 
remaining industry effects.      
The results of the conditional analysis are provided in Panel B of Table 3. The numbers in 
the table are the percentage of respondents that answered that the factor was important. For 
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example, 41.3 percent of the public firms responded that the foreign tax rate was important among 
all the factors they consider when deciding to locate overseas.  
Several interesting observations emerge from these data. Significantly more public firms 
rate the tax and financial accounting factors as being important than do private firms. Indeed, only 
11 percent of the private firms in our sample rate financial accounting expense deferral as 
important compared to the 37 percent of public firms that rate the factor as important. This result 
is consistent with prior literature that concludes that because public firms are under greater 
financial reporting pressure they consider financial accounting effects as more important (Cloyd et 
al., 1996; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mikhail, 1999).   
 Consistent with our stated prediction, significantly more firms with a low GAAP ETR rate 
cash tax deferral and accounting expense deferral as being important when deciding where to 
locate operations. This result may seem counter-intuitive at first but as discussed above, we 
interpret the GAAP ETR as a proxy for overall tax and financial reporting preferences with regard 
to the income tax expense. Firms that have a low GAAP ETR take actions to make it low and thus, 
it makes sense that these would be the same firms that are concerned about taxes and the financial 
accounting effects (in other words, firms with high ETRs reveal a preference of less concern about 
effective rates or they would have taken actions to reduce their GAAP ETR in the first place).   
Consistent with our stated prediction, firms with relatively high R&D (scaled by sales) rate 
cash tax deferral and financial accounting expense deferral as being significantly more important 
than firms with low R&D. Firms with high R&D have proportionally more intangible assets which 
are easier to source to (and ship from) a foreign location. As a result, high R&D companies rate 
tax and accounting concerns as more important relative to all other concerns because they have 
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fewer (at least different) other concerns (Wilson, 1993).19 For example, it would be more difficult 
for a heavy manufacturer of construction equipment to move to Ireland and ship the heavy 
equipment than it is for an intangible asset firm to locate in Ireland and ship their product.   
The data also reveal that firms with foreign source earnings and with a high percentage of 
foreign assets rate the tax and accounting effects as important more often than firms without much 
foreign activity. Thus, firms concerned with cash taxes and financial reporting effects more 
actively move operations overseas to minimize taxes and tax expense.  
We present some conditional graphical analysis in Panel B of Figure 1. We include data in 
this panel from a subsample of firms for which we would expect the accounting implications of 
foreign earnings to be important – publicly traded firms that have positive foreign assets (N = 
284). We further subdivide these publicly traded firms into those with high research and 
development spending (lighter shaded, top bar) and those with low research development spending 
(darker shaded bottom bar) to proxy for the level of intangibles.20 The data here are even starker 
(see Panel B of Figure 1). For example, nearly 60 percent of publicly traded firms with foreign 
assets and high research and development spending rate the accounting expense deferral under 
APB 23 as an important factor in their decision to locate investment in a foreign jurisdiction.      
 In Panel C of Table 3, we present results from the estimation of multivariate regressions 
including the variables used in the conditional univariate analysis in Panel B. We estimate separate 
regressions, one using the rating of cash tax deferral as the dependent variable and another with 
                                                 
19 Indeed, in discussions with respondent companies, one heavy manufacturer with low R&D spending said their 
decision is driven by the need to reach the local customer and nothing else. The respondent went on to say that he 
disagreed with the view expressed by policy-makers often that the decision for operation location for U.S. 
multinationals is U.S. or China (or elsewhere). This respondent indicated that if a company is trying to reach 
customers in China, the decision is China or not building at all.   
20 We assign a high R&D indicator for those firms with greater than the median research and development (scaled by 
sales) spending of those firms in our sample that had positive research and development spending.   
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the rating of financial accounting expense deferral as the dependent variable.21 The results indicate 
that being publicly held, having foreign source earnings, having a high percentage of foreign 
assets, and having high research and development spending are significant predictors of the rated 
importance of delaying expense recognition on financial statements. This corroborates the 
implications from the univariate analysis. Note that we present the regressions both with and 
without industry fixed effects where we include nine industry fixed effects, one for each of the 
industry classifications in Table 1 that comprise at least two percent of the sample. The effect of 
industry for the remaining firms (those from industries which make up less than two percent of the 
sample and those that did not provide an industry code) is captured in the intercept. The inferences 
are the same with or without industry fixed effects. 
Overall, we document that the availability of accounting expense deferral under APB 23 is 
an important factor in determining where to locate operations and its importance is statistically 
indistinguishable from the importance of the availability of cash tax deferral. Furthermore, our 
data indicate that firm characteristics (e.g., public versus private ownership, having high or low 
R&D spending, etc.) are related to the importance assigned to both the tax and financial 
accounting factors that affect the decision of where to locate operations around the world.      
5.2.3. Reinvestment vs. repatriation decision – unconditional analysis 
Figure 2 summarizes results regarding the importance of factors considered when firms 
decide between reinvesting foreign earnings overseas versus repatriating the foreign earnings to 
the U.S. Panel A presents the data for the all respondents who answered the question.22 The 
                                                 
21 Note that we do not have the amount of research and developmental spending for private firms.  Thus, to include 
both R&D and an indicator for being publicly held, we create an indicator variable for having nonmissing R&D in 
Compustat (some public firms have a missing value) and then interact this indicator variable with the spending on 
R&D.  In addition, we convert the high/low variables in Panel B into continuous variables to mitigate the effects of 
multicollinearity.  
22  We include two additional factors for the repatriation decision relative to the location decision question discussed 
above.  We include a factor for the relative rates of return because Hartman (1985) is very explicit that this is the most 
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unconditionally most important repatriation factor is the “rate of return outside the U.S. is higher 
than that in the U.S.” with nearly 60 percent of respondents indicating the rate of return is 
important. U.S. cash tax deferral is the second most important factor, with approximately half of 
the respondents rating cash deferral as important. Interestingly, nearly 45 percent of the 
respondents rate the financial accounting expense deferral under APB 23 as important, making it 
the third most important factor.   
Table 4 presents the responses in table format. In Panel A, for each factor, we present the 
percent of respondents that answered that the factor was important (received a rating of 3 or 4) and 
the percent of firms that answered that the factor was not important (a rating of 0 or 1). The mean 
ratings are 2.58 for higher rates of return outside the U.S., 2.29 for U.S. cash tax deferral, 2.18 for 
financial accounting expense deferral under APB 23, and 2.15 for the foreign tax rate. We note 
that the average ratings for the tax and accounting factors for the repatriation question are higher 
than the ratings in the location of foreign operations question (1.76 and 1.65 for the location 
decision, respectively). This result is consistent with expectations because there are fewer 
operational, non-tax, non-accounting factors to consider once the decision to operate overseas has 
been made and thus, the importance of the accounting and tax factors rises.   
Of note is that financial accounting expense deferral has an average importance rating that 
is not significantly different than the importance rating for U.S. cash tax deferral (t-statistic of the 
difference is 1.13). As before, a “paper” accounting consideration is statistically as important as a 
“real” cash deferral. This result is quite surprising to us given that the prior literature scarcely 
mentions financial accounting considerations as a driver affecting the decision of whether to 
                                                                                                                                                                
important consideration for the repatriation decision (in fact the only consideration under certain conditions).  We 
include a factor “the need for foreign cash to service debt” because one of our beta test companies suggested that we 
include it. 
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reinvest or repatriate foreign earnings (with the exception of concurrent papers Shackelford et al. 
(2009) and Blouin et al. (2009)). 
5.2.4. Reinvestment vs. repatriation decision – conditional analysis 
 Panel B of Table 4 analyzes the data for various sub-samples of firms for the repatriation 
versus reinvestment decision (based on the same conditioning variables as in Table 3). The 
patterns for the repatriation responses are very similar to those for the location decision (Table 3). 
For example, when deciding whether to repatriate earnings, publicly traded firms are more likely 
than private firms to rate both cash tax deferral and financial accounting expense deferral as being 
important.23 The most striking difference is the rating of the financial accounting expense deferral: 
51.4 percent of public firms rate this factor as important while only 14.7 percent of private firms 
do so. Again, this result is consistent with public firms being under more pressure to report higher 
financial accounting returns.24  
 In addition to the private/public contrast, we find that larger firms, firms with a higher 
foreign asset percentage, firms that have a lower GAAP effective tax rate, and firms with 
relatively high R&D spending all rate the importance of cash tax deferral and the importance of 
financial accounting expense deferral more highly than their counterparts. We examine the effect 
of having a U.S. NOL on this decision because it could be that firms with an NOL are not 
concerned with the tax and accounting effects because the U.S. NOL would offset any incremental 
tax upon repatriation (and thus perhaps the inclusion of these firms would cause our results to be 
                                                 
23 One possible explanation as to why public firms rate cash tax deferral more highly than private firms is that the 
survey question is phrased “relative to all other” considerations the firms have.  Private firms likely have fewer 
opportunities to raise capital than public firms thus, quite likely need to use internal funds more often, even when 
subject to a costly repatriation tax.  As a result, among private firms tax and accounting effects are less important in a 
relative rating of all other factors (given that the need for domestic financing may rate more highly). 
24 While the financial accounting result is consistent with Blouin et al.’s (2009) assumption for public firms and 
capital market pressures, the fact that public firms rate cash tax deferral significantly higher than private firms 
confounds Blouin et al. analysis because their research design requires the assumption that public and private firms 
value cash tax deferral equally (for tax purposes). They require this assumption so that they can interpret any 
difference in public firm repatriations on a tax cost variable as being evidence of public firms being concerned with 
the financial accounting tax expense deferral. 
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understated). However, running counter to this reasoning is the possibility that a U.S. taxpayer 
would not use the U.S. NOL to offset fully taxable dividends that could be left offshore (because 
the firm might rather use the net operating loss to offset other earnings). In our data, we find no 
difference in the rankings for firms with a U.S. NOL.  
Panel B of Figure 2 presents the data from the sub-sample of firms that are publicly traded 
and that have foreign assets. Again the lighter shaded bar on top for each factor represents firms 
that have high research and development spending and the lower, darker bars represent firms with 
relatively little research and development spending. The responses for the importance of the cash 
tax and financial accounting expense deferral factors are greater for R&D intensive companies. 
Nearly 64 percent of these firms rate the financial accounting expense deferral as being important.    
 We again estimate multivariate regressions using the above conditioning variables and 
present these results in Panel C of Table 4. The variables that statistically explain the importance 
of financial accounting expense deferral in the repatriation decision are 1) being publicly traded, 
2) having a high foreign asset percentage, and 3) having high research and development 
expenses.25 
5.2.5.  How much unremitted foreign earnings are designated as permanently reinvested? 
  To get a sense of the importance of the APB 23 permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) 
designation, we ask our sample firms how much unremitted foreign earnings (URE) their 
companies had and how much of those earnings were designated as permanently reinvested under 
APB 23.26  
                                                 
25 We again estimate the regressions both with and without industry fixed effects.  
26 We obtain these data as of the date June 30, 2003. That is the date required to be used when firms computed 
qualifying dividends when they repatriated foreign source earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
(the Act).  See below for a discussion of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  Note this question was only 
answered by firms who took advantage of the Act to repatriate foreign earnings. The answers relate to account 
balances just prior to the enactment of the Act.  
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These data are presented in Table 5. The average ratio of PRE to URE is 0.76, indicating 
that three-fourths of all accumulated foreign earnings are declared permanently reinvested. Table 5 
also indicates that the median firm classifies all unremitted foreign earnings as permanently 
reinvested and that 75 percent of companies classify at least 57 percent of unremitted earnings as 
permanently reinvested. That more than half the sample designates 100 percent of their unremitted 
earnings as permanently reinvested indicates that the APB 23 tax expense deferral is an important 
accounting rule.27 
5.2.6.     What if APB 23 were repealed (i.e., the recognition of tax expense was required)? 
 To further investigate the importance of financial accounting expense, we asked the 
following question “If the rule allowing the deferral of U.S. tax expense under APB 23 were 
repealed but the deferral of cash tax until repatriation was still allowed, would your company 
repatriate more foreign earnings as dividends (in other words, if your company had to immediately 
accrue the tax expense for financial accounting would your company repatriate more 
dividends?)?” As summarized in Figure 3, approximately 17 percent of the respondents said yes, 
they would repatriate more foreign earnings if APB 23 were repealed. In addition, 43 percent of  
the respondents responded “maybe” they would repatriate more if APB 23 were repealed, and we 
interpret maybe to indicate that the option would be considered. Thus, 60 percent of the 
respondents indicate that they would consider bringing more cash back to the U.S. even if it meant 
incurring the U.S. cash taxes upon repatriation, if their company had to record financial 
accounting tax expense on those earnings regardless of whether they repatriate. In other words, if 
                                                 
27 In our sample, the percentage of unremitted foreign earnings designated as PRE might be overstated relative to all 
firms in the Compustat universe. The percentage PRE might be overstated because the firms for which we have these 
data are firms that repatriated earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act which allowed a lower tax price upon 
repatriations (5.25% versus 35%, before credits). These repatriating firms may be different than the average 
Compustat company. One specific way in which they may be different is that they may have anticipated the 2004 rate 
reduction and surrounding rules and increased the amount of permanently reinvested earnings to maximize their low-
tax repatriations. We cannot calibrate the amount of unremitted foreign earnings, however, because such data are not 
disclosed by firms and thus not in Compustat. 
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the exception to deferred tax accounting were discontinued for foreign earnings permanently 
reinvested, many of the respondents would at least consider repatriating the earnings and incurring 
the cash tax cost. This result suggests that in addition to cash tax costs contributing to the large 
balance sheet cash balances observed in Foley et al. (2007), financial reporting considerations 
could be another cause of “trapped” equity or high cash holdings observed at many firms. We 
investigate this issue more fully in Section 6.  
5.2.7.    Discussion of the one time dividend received deduction on repatriations after 2004 
The survey questions discussed above and the main emphasis of the paper addresses 
financial accounting effects on general investment and repatriation decisions. We also asked the 
executives several questions about the importance of accounting effects when their firm faced the 
decision to repatriate earnings under a special “one-time” reduction of the tax on repatriated 
earnings. This section briefly discusses the responses to those questions. 
The American Jobs Creation Act (the Act) was enacted into law on October 22, 2004 and a 
portion of the Act was codified in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 965. The Act provided 
that a corporation that is a U.S. shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation may elect, for one 
taxable year, an 85 percent dividend received deduction (i.e., not have to pay tax on 85 percent of 
received dividends) with respect to certain cash dividends it receives from its foreign 
subsidiaries.28 This deduction provision effectively reduced the applicable U.S. tax rate on 
qualified repatriations from the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate of 35 percent (less applicable 
credits) to 5.25 percent (less applicable credits) (5.25 = 15 percent times 35 percent).29 In this 
                                                 
28 See IRS Notice 2005-10 for the definition of cash dividends.  The election could only be made for one of the 
following years 1) the last tax year that began after October 22, 2004 or 2) the first tax year that began during the one 
year period beginning on October 22, 2004. 
29 Part of our survey instrument gathered information about non-financial accounting issues related to the Act (e.g., 
the sources and uses of funds repatriated under the Act, tax policy questions, etc.): we present the results from these 
questions in a companion paper (Graham et al., 2009). The current paper and Graham et al. (2009) use the same 
survey instrument to gather data but the two papers examine different research questions. More specifically, Graham 
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paper, we discuss only the questions that address the financial accounting effects firms might have 
considered when deciding whether to repatriate earnings under the Act.  
The dividends received deduction in the Act was subject to several limitations. For the 
purposes of our paper, the only relevant limitation was that the amount of dividends eligible for 
the deduction was limited to the greater of the following 1) $500 million, 2) the amount shown on 
the taxpayer’s applicable financial statement as being permanently reinvested outside of the U.S. 
(the applicable financial statement is the most recently audited financial statement which is 
certified on or before June 30, 2003 as being prepared in accordance with GAAP, and if the 
taxpayer is required to file with the SEC is so filed on or before June 30, 2003). 30  
This limitation (to PRE or $500M) provided a maximum in terms of amount repatriated that 
would qualify for the deduction but the Act did not require funds to be repatriated from 
permanently reinvested earnings (i.e., the cash could have been repatriated from unremitted 
foreign earnings that were not designated as permanently reinvested). Thus, the outcome for 
financial accounting purposes in terms of the effect on income could vary across firms. For 
example, if a company repatriated permanently reinvested earnings for which no U.S. tax had been 
previously accrued, the repatriation would increase the firm’s U.S. tax expense by the 5.25 percent 
tax on the repatriated earnings (less any available foreign tax credits). On the other hand, if a firm 
repatriated earnings that were not designated as permanently reinvested, the repatriation of the 
funds and the associated 5.25 percent tax could decrease the firm’s tax expense (and increase 
earnings) because those earnings would probably have had a higher rate of tax accrued than the 
                                                                                                                                                                
et al. (2009) focus on the Act and the sources and uses of funds that companies repatriated under the Act.  Graham et 
al. (2009) also examine the costs firms incur to avoid the repatriation tax in general. Graham et al. (2009) do not 
investigate financial accounting issues or effects. 
30 For more details on the Act and the dividend received deduction see IRC Section 965, IRS Notice 2005-10, Blouin 
and Krull (2009), Brennan (2008), Graham et al. (2009), and others. 
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5.25 percent (less credits). Thus, in the latter case, the repatriation of dividends and payment of the 
5.25 percent tax under the Act could have increased earnings.   
 A firm specific example highlights this effect. General Electric repatriated $1.2 billion of 
foreign earnings, which had the effect of reducing their GAAP ETR by approximately 0.5 
percent.31 In an investor relations conference call where a question was asked about how 
repatriating earnings could reduce the GAAP ETR, the GE representative explained that the 
“…majority of them (foreign reinvested earnings) are continually permanently reinvested in 
productive assets overseas…but that they had $1.2 billion overseas that we thought we could 
repatriate which had been provided at rates above the repatriation rate of 5%.” Thus, GE 
repatriated non-PRE earnings but in an amount less than their PRE. The reversal of the previously 
recorded deferred tax liability down to the tax owed at the lower rate under the Act resulted in a 
decrease in GE’s GAAP ETR and an increase in earnings (of roughly $107 million).   
We discussed this GAAP ETR effect with one of the beta test companies. The tax 
executive said that there were two reasons that his company repatriated funds from non-PRE: 1) it 
avoided any hassles with their auditor over the company bringing back earnings that were 
previously designated as permanently reinvested, and 2) it avoided an income statement hit. In our 
sample, when we directly ask companies whether they brought earnings back from a non-PRE 
pool, 26 percent of the respondents (that answered this question) said that they did (untabulated).32   
To evaluate the overall importance of the financial accounting expense deferral for firms 
that repatriated under the Act, we listed “Additional financial accounting expense that could result 
                                                 
31 Data are from GE’s 2005 10-K. 
32 There are 31 firms in our sample that had non-PRE but did not repatriate those non-PRE earnings.  The average 
(and median) firm that could have repatriated non-PRE but did not is smaller (in terms of assets, sales, and market 
value) and has much lower growth metrics (sales and asset growth and market-to-book ratios) than firms that 
repatriated non-PRE.  Thus, on average these firms appear to be under less capital market scrutiny, which may provide 
one explanation for their decision not to repatriate non-PRE earnings.  However, we asked one of the larger 
companies that had non-PRE, why they repatriated only PRE.  Their response was that they still planned future 
repatriations and thus needed to retain the tax accrual on the books for those future repatriations.     
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if earnings previously designated as permanently reinvested were repatriated” as a factor when we 
asked firms the following question “When considering whether and to what extent your company 
would repatriate earnings utilizing the Act’s one-time dividends received deduction, which of the 
following were of most concern/importance to your company (e.g., which items received the most 
attention in planning all aspects of the repatriation)?” In our sample, 43.2 percent of the firms 
reported that the additional financial accounting tax expense that would be reported upon 
repatriation of permanently reinvested earnings was important in their decision of whether to, and 
the extent to, repatriate earnings under the Act (see Figure 4). For a factor not investigated 
previously in the literature, 43 percent is a surprisingly large proportion of firms to view this factor 
as important. In addition, the importance of the repatriation’s effect on the financial accounting 
expense is statistically indistinguishable from the importance of the effect on the cash taxes 
(untabulated t-statistic of 1.19 for the difference in the average rating).33 In addition, it is important 
to remember that the importance of the financial accounting effects may be understated because 
some firms were able to decrease their tax expense through the rules of the Act, thus increasing 
earnings (by repatriating earnings not designated as PRE) and because firms could clearly disclose 
why the effective tax rate increased (i.e., the Act allowing a lower cash tax rate on repatriations). 
 
 
   
                                                 
33 In addition, several companies wrote in responses in the “Other” category.  Such responses for this question about 
the factors important when repatriating earnings under the Act included those that indicated that it was very important 
to their company to repatriate earnings in a way that decreased the firm’s effective tax rate and increased earnings. 
One such comment was “…5.25% tax applied to earnings on which a 35% deferred tax had been accrued.” Another 
similar response was “All foreign earnings are expected to be repatriated so primary consideration was reducing the 
U.S. tax that had been provided and decreasing the effective tax rate.” Another comment was that the main 
consideration was “Anticipated future effective tax rate benefits related to a reduction in future repatriations of low-
tax foreign earnings.”  Thus, some of the “other” comments include financial accounting concerns as well.  The fact 
that respondents took the time to write these comments in underscores the importance of financial accounting 
considerations. 
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6.  Is There an Accounting Based Explanation for Why Firms Hold So Much Cash? 
 Foley et al. (2007) examine whether cash (repatriation) tax costs help explain the large 
cash balances observed on multinational firms’ balance sheets. Using confidential BEA survey 
data for approximately 1,600 observations they document a positive relation between cash tax 
costs and foreign cash holdings and a negative but insignificant relation between cash tax costs 
and domestic cash holdings. The authors conclude that the cash tax costs of repatriation are a 
significant cause of firms holding so much cash on their balance sheet. They highlight that much 
of this cash is held overseas (but they cannot definitively show that there is substitution of foreign 
cash for U.S. cash).  
 Our evidence above suggests financial accounting tax expense deferral could be another 
explanation for the large observed cash balances. To further examine this research question we 
attempt to replicate the Foley et al. (2007) results in our sample using the financial accounting 
importance rating as our main test variable. If the accounting implications are important, we would 
expect that the relation between cash balances and our APB 23 tax expense deferral rating would 
be significantly positive. However, our tests are subject to several limitations. First, because the 
expense deferral depends on the cash tax deferral, the two effects are somewhat difficult to 
disentangle in a regression setting (the correlation between the two ratings in our survey responses 
is around 0.80). Second, we have a much smaller sample size (N=267 for our largest regression) 
and an ordinal rating between 0 and 4 for our independent variable. Finally, while we would like 
to use the ratio of foreign cash/total assets we cannot because we do not have foreign cash 
holdings, only total worldwide cash for the subset of sample firms on Compustat. Thus, we use 
two proxies for foreign cash holdings, neither of which are perfect. The proxies we use are total 
worldwide cash holdings multiplied by the percentage of foreign assets the firm discloses in the 
survey (scaled by assets excluding the estimate of foreign cash) and the amount of permanently 
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reinvested earnings (scaled by assets excluding cash). We estimate two different regressions using 
the two different proxies for foreign cash and we include industry fixed effects.  
Our results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. First, we regress the log of our estimate of 
foreign cash scaled by net assets on each of the ratings – the importance of cash tax deferral and 
the importance of financial accounting expense deferral – separately and then together. The 
coefficient on each of the ratings is positive and significant when each is in the regression alone. 
When both ratings are included in the same regression, both have a positive coefficient but the 
financial accounting rating is insignificant. We also estimate a regression including all the control 
variables used in Foley et al. (2007) but requiring these variables reduces the sample size 
significantly. Neither of our test variables is significant at conventional levels in these expanded 
specifications.34     
The results of the regression using our second proxy for foreign cash holdings, the amount 
of permanently reinvested earnings scaled by total assets (PRE/TA) (where assets again are 
defined as assets less cash), as the dependent variable are in Panel B of Table 6.35 When the 
importance rating of APB 23 deferral is included on its own (second column of results) or with 
cash tax deferral (third column of results), it is significant in explaining the PRE/TA dependent 
variable consistent with financial accounting effects increasing the amount of foreign cash 
holdings (as proxied by PRE/TA). When we add the additional control variables, the importance 
of APB 23 tax expense deferral retains significance. We also note that the coefficient on foreign 
income is positive and significant and the coefficient on domestic income is negative and 
                                                 
34 The cash tax rating is marginally significant at a one-tailed p-value of 0.07. 
35 We caveat that a firm could have a large amount of earnings designated as permanently reinvested but have little 
cash if the earnings are reinvested in operating assets. On the other hand, while some firms did have to borrow 
significant sums of cash to repatriate under the Act, Graham et al. (2009) document that 62 percent of all funds 
repatriated from their sample of firms repatriated from cash holdings and 13 percent of the funds were repatriated 
from foreign financial assets. Thus, there is likely a significant positive correlation between PRE and foreign cash 
holdings. 
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significant, similar to the Foley et al. (2007) tests using foreign cash holdings as the dependent 
variable. Given the constraints of the data and sample, these results provide some evidence that 
APB 23 deferral of recording tax expense on financial statements contributes to trapped foreign 
earnings and high cash balances.36 However, due to the limitations of our regressions and the 
proxies we use for foreign cash holdings, these results must be interpreted with some reserve.  
7. Conclusions  
Our main objective in this paper is to examine whether the ability to avoid or defer the 
recording of income tax expense for financial accounting is an important consideration in real 
corporate investment decisions regarding location of operations and whether to repatriate foreign 
earnings to the U.S. or reinvest the foreign earnings overseas.  Shackelford et al. (2009) predict 
and model that both cash tax deferral and financial accounting expense deferral may be important 
factors for firms as they decide where to locate operations. Our results support their location 
predictions. We extend our tests to investigate the repatriation versus reinvestment decision and 
find that financial reporting effects are important in this decision as well.   
We examine survey responses from nearly 600 executives and find evidence consistent 
with the deferral of income tax expense for financial accounting being important in corporate 
decisions regarding location of operations and whether to repatriate or reinvest earnings. For 
example, 31 percent of the respondents rated deferral under APB 23 as being important in their 
decision to locate operations outside of the U.S. In addition, 44 percent of respondents stated that 
deferral of the financial accounting tax expense is important in their decision of whether to 
reinvest foreign earnings outside of the U.S. These percentages are markedly higher for firms that 
                                                 
36 Recall that firms provided importance ratings for both the investment location decision and the reinvestment versus 
repatriation decision.  We use the ratings from the investment decision in the regressions above in order to maximize 
the number of observations.  We also estimate the same regressions described above but with importance ratings from 
the reinvestment versus repatriation decision.   Few factors are significant in explaining Cash/TA but in the PRE/TA 
regressions the results are similar to those described above except when all the control variables are included the 
importance of cash tax deferral and accounting expense deferral become insignificant.     
 37
are publicly traded, have foreign assets, and have high research and development spending –
companies for which one might expect the financial accounting incentives to be highest.  
For both decisions – where to locate operations and whether to reinvest or repatriate – the 
importance of the financial accounting tax expense deferral is not statistically different than the 
importance of cash tax deferral when making these decisions. This result is important in light of 
the decades of research on the location and repatriation decisions that considers the cash tax 
implications but heretofore has not examined the financial accounting implications. Our results 
show that the accounting expense deferral is important to firms and appears to provide an 
incentive, along with the relatively high corporate tax rates in the U.S., to move operations and 
investments overseas and to reinvest more of the foreign earnings overseas as well. In addition, if 
the determinants of corporations making investments in the U.S. or elsewhere  are important to 
U.S. policymakers, then our results should be informative in that the determinants include not only 





Public/Private = Company responses to a question that asks if the firm is public and traded on 
NYSE or on NASDAQ/AMEX or if the firm is private.   
 
Size  = Total assets of the firm in the most recent fiscal year prior to completion of the 
survey, self-reported by the respondents.  Firms above the median are considered 
large firms and those below the median are considered small firms.  
 
Foreign Asset  
Percentage  = Company responses to a question that asked the respondent for the percentage of 
foreign assets in foreign locations.  Firms with a percentage greater (lower) than the 
sample median are considered to have a high (low) ratio. 
 
Foreign Source  
Earnings  = Indicator variable representing responses to a question that asked the respondent 
whether their company has had foreign source earnings in the last ten years.  The 
variable is set to one if the respondent answered their company did have foreign 
source earnings and zero otherwise. 
 
GAAP ETR = The companies’ effective tax rate (total worldwide tax expense/worldwide pre-tax 
book income) for the last fiscal year prior to completion of the survey.  Obtained 
from reported survey answers for the private companies and from Compustat data 
for the public firms.  A high (low) GAAP ETR is defined as being above (below) 
the sample median. 
 
U.S. NOL =  Company responses about whether the firm had a U.S. net operating loss (U.S. 
NOL) for tax purposes in the latest fiscal year-end before the completion of the 
survey.  
 
R&D =  The level of research and development spending scaled by sales.  These data are 
from Compustat.  We do not have data for the private firms for this item.  Firms 
with an R&D spending amount above (below) the sample median are considered 
high (low).  If R&D expense is missing on Compustat we replace with zero. 
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Appendix B 
Example of Firm Disclosure of Foreign Earnings Tax Effects 
Note 10: Income Taxes 
Under SFAS 109, “Accounting for Income Taxes,” income taxes are recognized for the amount of taxes payable for 
the current year and for the impact of deferred tax liabilities and assets, which represent future tax consequences of 
events that have been recognized differently in the financial statements than for tax purposes. Deferred tax assets and 
liabilities are established using the enacted statutory tax rates and are adjusted for any changes in such rates in the 
period of change. 
Earnings before income taxes consisted of the following: 
Years ended June 30 2008 2007 2006 
United States $ 9,142 $ 9,138 $ 7,410 
International 6,936 5,572 5,003 
Total 16,078 14,710 12,413 
    
The income tax provision consisted of the following: 
Years ended June 30 2008 2007 2006 
Current Tax Expense 
U.S. federal $1,016 $2,667 $1,961 
International 1,546 1,325 1,702 
U.S. state and local 227 125 178 
  2,789 4,117 3,841 
Deferred Tax Expense 
U.S. federal 1,267 231 226 
International and other (53) 22 (338) 
  1,214 253 (112) 
Total Tax Expense 4,003 4,370 3,729 
A reconciliation of the U.S. federal statutory income tax rate to our actual income tax rate is provided below: 
Years ended June 30 2008 2007 2006 
U.S. federal statutory income tax rate 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 
Country mix impacts of foreign operations -6.6% -4.3% -3.6% 
Income tax reserve adjustments -3.1% -0.3% -1.5% 
Other -0.4% -0.7% 0.1% 
Effective Income Tax Rate 24.9% 29.7% 30.0% 
We have undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries of approximately $21 billion at June 30, 2008, for which 
deferred taxes have not been provided. Such earnings are considered indefinitely invested in the foreign subsidiaries. 
If such earnings were repatriated, additional tax expense may result, although the calculation of such additional taxes 
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Notes:  Survey responses to the question: Relative to all the factors your company considers when making a decision 
about whether to locate operations in the U.S. or outside the U.S., how important are the following?  All data are 
obtained from a survey of corporate tax executives.  The survey provides a 5 point rating scale ranging from 0 to 4.  
The zero rating is labeled “Not at all important” and the rating of 4 is labeled “very important.”  The data above are 
the percentage of firms that answered that the listed factor was important at either the 3 or 4 rating.  In Panel B the top 






Factors Important in the Decision of Whether to Reinvest or Repatriate Foreign Earnings 
Outside the U.S. 
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Panel B: Public Firms with Assets in a Foreign Location 
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Notes:  Survey responses to the question: In general, what factors are important in your company’s decision 
to reinvest foreign earnings outside of the U.S.?  All data are obtained from a survey of corporate tax 
executives.  The survey provides a 5 point rating scale ranging from 0 to 4.  The zero rating is labeled “Not 
at all important” and the rating of 4 is labeled “very important.”  The data above are the percentage of firms 
that answered that the listed factor was important at either the 3 or 4 rating.   In Panel B the top series are 





Response to a Hypothetical Repeal of Deferral under APB 23 
(N=315) 
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Survey responses to the question “If the rule allowing the deferral of U.S. tax expense under 
APB 23 were repealed but the deferral of cash tax until repatriation was still allowed, would your 
company repatriate more foreign earnings as dividends (in other words, if your company had to 
immediately accrue the tax expense for financial accounting would your company repatriate 




















Factors Important for Firms Taking Advantage of the One-Time Dividends Received 
Deduction in the 2004 Tax Act  
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would create
(2)  Additional financial accounting expense that
could result if earnings previously designated as
permanently reinvested were repatriated
(3)  Other
(4)  Possible scrutiny from external auditor about
repatriating earnings previously designated as
permanently reinvested




Notes:  Survey responses to the question: When considering whether and to what extent your company 
would repatriate earnings utilizing the Act’s one-time dividend received deduction, which of the 
following were of most concern/importance to your company (e.g., which items received the most 
attention in planning all aspects of the repatriation)? All data are obtained from a survey of corporate tax 
executives.  The survey provides a 5 point rating scale ranging from 0 to 4.  The zero rating is labeled 
“Not at all important” and the rating of 4 is labeled “very important.”  The data above are the percentage 
















Ownership (N=594) Assets (N=535) Entities included in 1120 group (N=554)
Public - NYSE 47 <$500 million 26.9 1 0.54
Public - Nasdaq/Amex 28 $500 - $999 million 16.3 2 - 10 41.52
Private 23 $1 - $4.9 billion 32.7 11 - 50 42.24
Other  (e.g., OTC) 2 $5 - 10 billion 7.5 51 - 100 8.48
> $10 billion 16.6 > 100 7.22
Industry (N=595)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 0.17 Percent of Assets in Foreign Location (N=538) Number of Forms 1120 filed (N=582)
Mining 1.85 0% 25.46 1 60.48
Utilities 1.01 0-10% 26.77 2 - 10 28.35
Construction 1.51 11%-20% 11.52 11 - 50 8.76
Manufacturing 29.92 21%-30% 10.97 51 - 100 0.52
Wholesale Trade 5.04 31%-40% 9.29 101 - 1,000 1.55
Retail Trade 6.22 41%-50% 7.62 > 1,000 0.34
Transportation and Warehousing 2.02 51%-60% 2.42
Information 4.54 61%-70% 2.60 Number of Forms 5471 filed (N=580)
Finance and Insurance 5.04 71%-80% 1.67 Zero 19.48
Real Estate, Rental and Leasing 2.18 81%-90% 0.74 1 7.59
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 6.72 91%-100% 0.93 2 - 10 28.79
Management of Companies (Holding Companies) 15.80 11 - 50 29.83
Admin., Support, Waste Mgt. and Remediation Services 1.51 Prior year GAAP ETR (N=439) 51 - 100 8.45
Educational Services 0.50 <10% 10.9 > 100 5.86
Health Care and Social Assistance 1.18 10%-20% 4.8
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 1.01 20%-30% 18.5 Number of flow-through entities 
Accomodation and Food Services 1.68 30%-40% 55.6 in which firm has some ownership (N=588)
Other services 0.67 40%-50% 6.2 Zero 19.39
No code reported 11.43 >50% 4.1 1 9.52
2 - 10 45.24
File a consolidated Form 1120 (N=590) Percent of firms with NOLs 11 - 50 18.54
Yes 93.9 U.S. 46.3 51 - 100 4.59
No 6.1 Foreign 49.8 > 100 2.72
State 68.7




Notes:  The above data are all obtained through survey questions, with the exception of the GAAP effective tax rate (total tax expense divided by pre-tax book 
income) for the publicly traded firms which is obtained from Compustat.  Form 1120 is the U.S. Corporate Income Tax form.  Form 5471 is an informational return 
filed in the U.S. about the activities of a foreign controlled corporation owned more than 10 percent by a U.S. person (the definition of which includes a U.S. 
corporation).  
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 Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics of Compustat Firms, Nonresponders, and Responders 
(Non-response bias tests) 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 1 vs 2 1   vs   4 2   vs   4 3   vs   4
Assets 4,996 4,066.26 1,398      8,891.22 863 9,617.72 535 7,547.93 0.000 0.000 0.202 0.085
MVE 4,654 2,709.19 1,183      7,977.02 813 7,831.80 370 8,304.84 0.000 0.000 0.777 0.692
Sales 4,977 1,991.09 1,235      5,527.34 863 5,499.10 372 5,625.37 0.000 0.000 0.881 0.855
Debt 4,980 0.19 1,233      0.22 861 0.22 372 0.20 0.000 0.754 0.083 0.019
Cash 4,994 0.20 1,234      0.14 862 0.13 372 0.15 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.019
MB 4,653 3.75 1,183      3.28 813 3.26 370 3.29 0.000 0.005 0.946 0.891
ROA 4,976 -0.03 1,235      0.05 863 0.05 372 0.06 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.006
GAAP ETR 3,723 0.26 1,195      0.30 756 0.30 439 0.30 0.000 0.000 0.690 0.640
Asset growth 4,795 0.20 1,211      0.14 845 0.14 366 0.14 0.000 0.000 0.921 0.918
Sales growth 4,687 0.21 1,210      0.14 845 0.13 365 0.14 0.000 0.000 0.632 0.451
Industry
0 12 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.4% 0 0.0%
1 241 4.8% 58 4.7% 44 5.1% 14 3.6%
2&3 1,802      36.1% 549 44.0% 376 43.6% 173 45.1%
4 484 9.7% 141 11.3% 102 11.8% 39 10.2%
5 404 8.1% 152 12.2% 102 11.8% 50 13.0%
6 1,237      24.8% 142 11.4% 104 12.1% 38 9.9%
7 563 11.3% 155 12.4% 103 11.9% 52 13.5%
8 196 3.9% 43 3.4% 26 3.0% 17 4.4%
9 57 1.1% 4 0.3% 3 0.4% 1 0.3%
P-value
Survey Responders 
with available data 
(4)All Compustat (1)
All firms we 
contacted with 
available data (2)




 All dollar amounts are in millions. All Compustat variables are measured in the year 2006 and are winsorized at 1% and 99% of the distribution. Column (1) consists of all the 
firms on Compustat except for firms with a negative book value, firms whose name ends with LP, and firms incorporated outside of the U.S. Column (2) includes all the firms that 
were sent a survey (described earlier in the manuscript), that we could match to and retrieve the data on Compustat. Column (3) consists of the group of firms that are on 
Compustat and that we sent a survey to but did not receive a response. Column (4) includes the survey responders with data available on Compustat.  Assets is defined as world-
wide assets (Compustat data item AT).  MVE is the market value of equity (data PRCC_F times data CSHO).  Sales are total sales (data SALE) divided by total assets (data AT).  
Debt is the ratio of long-term debt (data DLTT) plus the debt included in current liabilities (data DLC) to total assets (data AT).  Cash is cash and marketable securities (dataCHE) 
scaled by total assets (data AT).  MB is the market-to-book ratio (MVE/data CEQ).  ROA is return-on-assets defined as net income (data NI) divided by total assets (data AT).  
GAAP ETR is the GAAP effective tax rate defined as total tax expense (data TXT) divided by pre-tax accounting income (data PI).  Industries are determined by SIC codes 
because these are all Compustat firms (for which we do not have the tax code for industry). The industry groups are as follows: 0 = Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; 1 = Mining 
and Construction; 2 = Manufacturing (Food, Tobacco, Lumber, Furniture, Paper, Chemicals); 3 = Manufacturing (Rubber, Leather, Stone, Metal, Electronics); 4 = Transportation, 
Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary; 5 = Wholesale and retail trade; 6 = Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; 7 = Hotel and Business Services; 8 = Health, Legal, and 




Factors Important in Where to Locate Operations 
 
Survey responses to the question: Relative to all the factors your company considers when making a decision about whether to locate 
operations in the U.S. or outside the U.S., how important are the following? 
 
Panel A: Unconditional Results 
Average
Factor % important % not important rating
(1) Foreign tax rate 38.17 42.83 1.86
(2) U.S. cash tax deferral 35.21 45.32 1.76
(3) Financial accounting expense deferral under APB23 31.53 51.12 1.65  
_____________________________________________________ 
Statistical Test of Differences in the Average Rating of the Factors  
Comparison    
    Factors  t-statistic 
(1) = (2)    1.13  
(2) = (3)   1.32 
(1) = (3)   2.45 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: Conditional Results 
%
Factor  important Obs Public Private Large Small Yes No High Low High Low High Low
(1) 38.2 537 41.3 26.7*** 42.9 33.6* 45.2 15.1*** 55.9 20.9*** 27.6 48.1*** 52.4 37.4***
(2) 35.2 534 38.5 23.3*** 42.5 28.2*** 41.9 14.3*** 48.0 22.8*** 25.2 44.3*** 50.5 33.7***











Table 3 (continued):  Factors Important in Where to Locate Operations 
 
Panel C:  Regression Results 
coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
Intercept 1.850 6.20 1.638 4.81 2.452 8.41 2.339 7.02
Public + 0.725 4.19 0.700 3.92 0.430 2.54 0.391 2.24
Assets 0.000 -0.23 0.000 0.41 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.97
Foreign source earnings + 0.921 5.62 0.886 5.32 1.078 6.73 1.019 6.25
Foreign asset percentage + 1.537 4.83 1.325 3.94 1.281 4.12 1.076 3.27
GAAP ETR - 0.038 0.10 -0.060 -0.15 -0.325 -0.84 -0.429 -1.09
Nonmissing R&D -0.041 -0.26 -0.560 -0.33 0.092 0.59 0.096 0.57
Nonmissing R&D *R&D + 3.892 3.51 3.132 2.70 2.932 2.70 2.196 1.93
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes
R-squared 0.276 0.307 0.273 0.304






Rating of cash tax
deferral
Rating of cash tax
deferral
 
Notes:  The survey provides a 5 point rating scale ranging from 0 to 4 with a rating of zero labeled “Not at all important” and a rating of 4 labeled 
“very important.”  The percentages listed in Panel A of the table under “% important” are the percentages of respondents that gave a rating of 3 or 
4 for that particular factor.  The percentages listed in Panel A of the table under the column “% not important” are the percentages of respondents 
that gave a rating of 0 or 1 for that particular factor.  The percentages listed in Panel B are only the percentages of firms that gave a rating of 3 or 4 
for the factor (i.e., the company rates the factor as important).  Statistical significance is based on tests of the average rating being different 
between factors in Panel A and tests of the average rating for the sub-samples being statistically different from each other in Panel B. ***, **, and 
* mark significance of .01, .05, and .10 respectively.  See Appendix A for definitions of the conditioning variables. Note that in the regression 
above we use the continuous version of the GAAP ETR and Foreign asset percentage. In addition, in order to be able to include public and private 
firms in the regression and test for the effect of R&D we establish an indicator variable set equal to 1 for observations that have nonmissing R&D 
and zero otherwise.   
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Table 4 
Reinvestment vs. Repatriation 
Panel A: Unconditional Results 
Survey responses to the question: In general, what factors are important in your company’s decision to reinvest foreign earnings 
outside of the U.S.? 
Average
Factor % important % not important rating
(1) Rate of return outside the U.S. > in the U.S. 58.4 19.9 2.58
(2) U.S. cash tax deferral 49.1 28.6 2.29
(3) Financial accounting expense deferral under APB23 44.9 31.9 2.18
(4) Foreign tax rate 40.8 26.7 2.15
(5) The need for cash to service foreign debt 27.8 54.9 1.48
(6) Other 16.5 70.0 0.95  
______________________________________________________ 
Statistical Test of Differences in the Average Rating of the Factors  
Comparison    
    Factors  t-statistic 
(1) = (2)    3.12  
(2) = (3)   1.13 
(3) = (4)   0.30 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: Conditional Results 
%
Factor  important Obs Public Private Large Small High Low High Low Yes No High Low
(1) 58.4 387 59.8 52.1* 62.9 53.1** 65.1 47.5*** 52.3 64.7* 56.2 59.0 53.5 63.0
(2) 49.1 385 52.7 32.9*** 55.1 44.4*** 56.4 38.1*** 37.4 61.1*** 48.4 51.1 64.3 45.8***
(3) 44.9 383 51.4 14.7*** 49.5 41.2** 53.8 30.4*** 32.8 58.1*** 45.7 44.8 65.7 43.5***
(4) 40.8 382 44.9 22.9*** 44.1 37.1 49.6 25.9*** 29.0 50.6*** 41.2 39.8 58.6 37.8***
(5) 27.8 381 28.5 24.6 32.1 24.1 32.8 20.6*** 28.5 27.1 30.2 25.4 19.4 30.7**
(6) 16.5 237 17.3 13.0 14.4 18.6 19.7 11.6*** 13.3 19.4 18.5 13.2 14.3 19.0
Ownership Size Foreign Asset Percentage GAAP ETR U.S. NOL R & D
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Table 4 (continued) 
Reinvestment vs. Repatriation  
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis  
coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
Intercept 0.957 3.95 1.054 3.18 1.370 5.71 1.629 5.00
Public + 1.055 4.73 1.038 4.43 0.532 2.41 0.497 2.15
Assets 0.000 0.04 0.000 0.17 0.000 0.59 0.000 0.47
NOL -0.054 -0.36 -0.073 -0.46 0.013 0.09 -0.035 -0.23
Foreign asset percentage + 1.168 3.40 1.112 2.99 1.132 3.33 1.009 2.76
GAAP ETR - -0.313 -0.68 -0.374 -0.78 -0.237 -0.52 -0.339 -0.72
Nonmissing R&D 0.209 1.12 0.212 1.02 0.379 2.06 0.443 2.18
Nonmissing R&D *R&D + 3.770 3.06 3.452 2.60 0.379 2.20 1.891 1.45
Industry fixed effects no yes no yes
R-squared 0.211 0.239 0.148 0.120






Rating of cash tax
deferral
Rating of cash tax
deferral
 
Notes:  The survey provides a 5 point rating scale ranging from 0 to 4 with a zero rating labeled “Not at all important” and a rating of 4 labeled 
“very important.”  The percentages listed in Panel A of the table under “% important” are the percentages of respondents that gave a rating of 3 or 
4 for that particular factor. The percentages listed in Panel A of the table under the column “% not important” are the percentages of respondents 
that gave a rating of 0 or 1 for that particular factor. The percentages listed in Panel B are only the percentages of firms that gave a rating of 3 or 4 
for the factor (i.e., the company ranks the factor as important).  Statistical significance is based on tests of the average rating being different 
between factors in Panel A and tests of the average rating for the sub-samples being statistically different from each other in Panel B. ***, **, and 
* mark significance of .01, .05, and .10 respectively.  See Appendix A for definitions of the conditioning variables. The sample is smaller than in 
Table 3 because only firms with foreign source earnings were directed to answer this question. See Table 3 for the adjustments made to the 








Information on Unremitted Foreign Earnings and Permanently Reinvested Earnings 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Sum
Unremitted foreign earnings 196 1,043 3,768 21 97 542 204,515
Permanently reinvested earnings 196 897 3,431 8 53 358 175,749
Ratio of PRE/URE 196 0.76 0.36 0.57 1.00 1.00 149.01
 
 
Notes: Unremitted foreign earnings (URE) are earnings in foreign subsidiaries that have not been repatriated to the U.S. parent company.  
Permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) is the portion of URE the firm designates as permanently reinvested and on which there is no U.S. income 
tax accrual provided.  Both amounts are from the survey data. There are a smaller number of observations in this table because the data are 
provided based on respondents to a question about a tax form filed to elect to take advantage of the one-time-dividends received deduction under 












Tests of Association Between Survey Ratings and Proxies for Foreign Cash Balances 
 
Panel A: Estimated foreign cash balance as a proxy for foreign cash balance 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(Estimate of Foreign Cash/Net Assets)
Variable coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
Intercept -6.408 -17.57 -6.059 -17.09 -6.412 -17.54 -5.261 -7.54 -4.780 -7.48
Importance rating of cash tax deferral + 0.449 5.36 0.415 3.18 0.203 1.51 0.156 1.18
Importance rating of APB23 expense deferral + 0.341 4.22 0.431 0.35 -0.167 -1.30 -0.107 -0.86
Domestic income - -1.984 -1.31 -2.136 -1.41
Foreign income + 12.586 4.02 13.881 4.60
Log assets 0.109 1.37 0.094 1.22
Dividend dummy - -0.329 -1.39 -0.299 -1.28
Book to market 0.086 0.41 0.049 0.24
St dev operating income 1.448 0.97 1.202 0.81
R&D + 7.271 2.69 8.755 3.42
Capex - 5.118 1.36 2.098 0.59
Market Leverage - -4.215 -4.98 -4.095 -5.13
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes no
N 266 267 267 177 177














Table 6 (continued) 
Tests of Association Between Survey Ratings and Proxies for Foreign Cash Balances 
Panel B: Amount of permanently reinvested earnings as proxy for foreign cash balance 
Dependent Variable = ln(PRE/Net Assets)
Variable coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat
Intercept 0.034 1.34 0.023 0.98 0.030 1.21 0.218 0.34 0.039 0.69
Importance rating of cash tax deferral + 0.007 1.14 -0.009 -0.89 -0.277 -2.13 -0.031 -2.53
Importance rating of APB23 expense deferral + 0.013 2.22 0.020 2.06 0.021 1.70 0.025 2.15
Domestic income - -0.531 -3.43 -0.525 -3.55
Foreign income + 1.070 3.71 1.109 4.02
Log assets 0.007 0.91 0.005 0.70
Dividend dummy - 0.008 0.35 0.006 0.26
Book to market 0.019 1.11 0.020 1.20
St dev operating income -0.075 -0.38 -0.082 -0.43
R&D + -0.136 -0.46 -0.104 -0.39
Capex - 0.648 1.65 0.541 1.54
Market Leverage - -0.121 -1.31 -0.112 -1.36
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes no
N 195 197 195 118 118
R2 0.072 0.090 0.093 0.325 0.307  
Notes: This table uses two proxies for foreign cash holdings and tests whether respondents’ answers for the importance of tax and accounting factors 
are determinants of the (proxies for) foreign cash holdings. Panel A  presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics from regressions of a ratio of an 
estimate of foreign cash holdings to the net assets (assets less the estimate of foreign cash) of the firm on the importance ratings of cash tax and 
accounting expense deferral (and control variables). The estimate of the foreign cash holdings is computed by multiplying each company’s foreign 
asset percentage by their total worldwide cash on the balance sheet (we only have for public firms). Panel B uses a different proxy for foreign cash 
holdings -  natural logarithm of the ratio of permanently reinvested earnings to assets (where assets are measured as total assets less cash).  
Importance rating of cash tax deferral and APB23 expense deferral are the ratings from Table 3. Following Foley et al. (2007) Domestic income and 
Foreign income are scaled by total assets. Domestic income is from Compustat and is pre-tax income and Foreign income is from Compustat and is 
also pre-tax.  Log assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets. Dividend dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and 
zero otherwise.  Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of common equity to market value of common equity.  Standard deviation of operating 
income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets measured over the five years prior to 2006.  R&D 
is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets.  Research and development is set to zero when missing. Capex is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets. Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market 
value of equity.   
